# (U) Russia: *SV Strike Operations*

(U) This infographic describes and depicts Russian ground forces (SV) doctrinal capabilities and employment of strikes from Missile and Artillery Troops (RViA), radio-electronic battle (REB), nuclear, biological, and chemical (RHBZ), and supporting Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS).

(U) The Russian military integrates effects from all available forces and means against an aggressor force as a strike that incorporates everything from pre-conflict information warfare to nuclear fires. Where the Soviet-era ground forces relied on massed artillery to create the desired battlefield effects, the current and future SV will integrate the capabilities of more precise reconnaissance, improved fire range and rates, and automated C2 complexes and still use massed fires to achieve the desired level of damage on aggressor targets. Russian drones routinely train with maneuver and artillery units and subunits to provide real-time target acquisition. These new capabilities continue the Russian principle that fires create the conditions that allow successful battlefield maneuver.



Motorized-Rifle Brigade 3,000 – 4,500 Troops

Per BN
**BTR** – 539pax, 44 BTR-80/82/MT-LB
9 ATGM, 8 (120mm )MTR, 6 AGS-17
or
**BMP** – 461pax, 37 BMP-2/BMP-3, 8 (120mm) MTR, 6 AGS-17

151pax, 31 – T72B3/T80/T90/T14

Per BN
211 pax, 18 SP Howitzer (152mm)

18 BM-21 MRL (122mm)

10 TIGR/TIGR-M, Radars – KREDO /SNAR-10 & Seismic sensors

12 SA-15
6 SA-13, 6 SA-19, 27 SA-18

6 MT-12 with MT-LB
24 AT-15 Springer on BMP or AT-14 Spriggan

Construction & Mobility – TMM-3, BAT-2, UR-77, GMZ-3, UR-83 and PP-91 bridge.

Satellite, HF, VHF

1,000 pax – Evacuation, Transport Fuel-Ammo-Supply-Material, Supply & Maintenance

Sniper teams equipped with laser sights, ballistic computers, automatic rifles, and long-range rifles of foreign manufacture

3 Orlon-10 drones

100pax, Jamming of HF, Ground & Air VHF, GMRS, GPS

~70pax, 1 TOS-1A, 60 RPO Shmel

(U) The reorganized SV continues to evolve the capabilities of ground maneuver forces while integrating network-centric warfare capabilities in a shift towards information dominance on the battlefield. Improved information flow in the SV allows a greater reliance on use of more precise targeting of fires to accomplish required battlefield effects. The SV considers the effects of precise targeting and fires to equal the impact of tactical nuclear weapons. This evolution does not change the SV use of fires as the leading force and means to accomplish actions during local wars and armed conflicts, defense, and offense. As the basis for the evolving integrated fires concept, the Russian military culture continues to view artillery fires as the true "God of War" as attributed to Joseph Stalin during World War II.



(U) In the brigade and division there are both man portable and vehicle mounted radars that add to the target acquisition capabilities. These reconnaissance platforms are linked by automated mobile field C2 systems such as the Strelets or Bylina to direct the actions of SV units.

(U) The SV's use of strike seeks to integrate all effects whether they be from information warfare, RViA, REB, RCBZ, VKS, or irregular warfare actions. Integration of these different capabilities at strategic and operational levels are Russia's primary focus with tactical level fires considered a secondary or culminating action to defeat or destroy an aggressor. At the tactical level, strike predominantly relies on fires from direct and indirect units and subunits to achieve the desired outcomes in combined-arms battle.

(U) Russia employs fires from non-strategic nuclear forces (нестратегические ядерные силы - nyestrategicheskiy yaderniy sili - NSYaSh) and conventional high-precision weapons (Высокоточное оружие - vysokotochnoye oruzhiye - VTO) complexes to conduct strategic operations for the destruction of critically important targets (стратегические операции по уничтожению критически важных целей - strategicheskiye operatsii po unichtozheniyu kriticheski vazhnykh ob"yektov - SODCIT). Russia states that the effects of VTO fires can be equal to those of NSYaSh in some circumstances. The SODCIT concept involves the application of progressive fire engagements used with the intent of de-escalation of local or regional conflicts. The strikes demonstrate to an aggressor Russia's resolve and its strike capabilities in order to deter escalation to large scale ground combat. Fire demonstrations increase over time with an intended effect of first deterring aggression towards Russia then escalating to strikes that serve the dual purpose of deterrence and degradation of aggressor capabilities.

(U) As indicated by the majority of the non-linear warfare characteristics being associated with strikes and their employment, one gains an appreciation of the priority placed on the function. Russia's non-linear battle concept anticipates the SV maneuver forces continuing to seize and hold terrain but only after strike complexes destroy aggressor units. The SV integrates all strike assets to focus on an aggressor force and remove its ability to affect the battle outcome. Strikes include artillery, rocket, and missile medium-to-long range massed indirect fires, engineer mines, chemical, special operations forces, information warfare and REB attacks, as well as irregular forces that influence or affect the tactical battle.

## (U) SV Combination of Types of Fires Supporting the Security Zone



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(U) The development and integration of UAS into the SV ground forces greatly reduced the amount of time needed to strike a target. In addition, the precision target acquisition allows a reduction in the specified number of rounds to achieve the desired level of damage to a target. Integration with the networked and automated C2 systems allows direct transmission of UAV target detections to firing subunits for engagement. The UAS capabilities also allows rapid battle damage assessments of fires to determine if the specified level of damage was achieved and whether reengagement is necessary. Automated transmission of target information from the UAS to the designated firing unit allows almost instantaneous engagement when all factors conform to the commander's plan.