

FMSO's Military DIME (M-DIME) Research Project

Tracking Russian and Chinese military influence in states around the world

Instruments of Russian Military Influence in Argentina

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OVERVIEW OF FMSO'S M-DIME RESEARCH PROJECT

The Military DIME (M-DIME) Research Project is a dynamic effort from researchers at the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command's Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO). Its goal is to provide Army leaders with a clear, comparative understanding of how China and Russia employ instruments of national power to obtain military influence around the world. The M-DIME framework is derived from the "DIME" concept, which classes instruments of national power into four types: Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Economic. Based on this concept, the M-DIME framework gives more narrow attention to the instruments that China and Russia employ to gain military influence in third-party countries.

The M-DIME framework's purpose is to track and analyze the military influence of "Benefactor" countries (i.e. China and Russia) in select "Recipient" countries in Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, and South and South-east Asia. Benefactor countries are assumed to engage in activities that result in them having increased military influence in Recipient countries to gain leverage over global rivals, competitors, and adversaries; for China and Russia, this means the United States. Within this framework, "military influence" is defined as the ability of a Benefactor country to shape or alter the attitudes, behaviors, and capabilities of actors within—and entities associated with—the armed forces of Recipient countries.

The M-DIME framework identifies 12 distinct instruments of national power employed by Benefactor countries to gain military influence in Recipient countries, three for each of the DIME categories. They are as follows:

DIPLOMATIC INSTRUMENTS

- D1 Defense-Related Diplomacy
- D2 International Military Education and Training
- D3 Soft Power Activities

INFORMATIONAL INSTRUMENTS

- I1 Cultural and Media Outreach, Collaboration and Alignment
- I2 Information and Communications Technology (ICT) Support
- I3 Cooperation in Military Intelligence and Communications

MILITARY INSTRUMENTS

- M1 Formal Bilateral Military Engagements
- M2 Shared Informal/Multilateral Military Engagements
- M3 Defense/Security Pacts and Agreements

ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS

- E1 Arms Transfers
- E2 Technology-Sharing and Joint Production Agreements
- E3 Trade and Cooperation in Strategic Commodities/Sectors

M-DIME analysis is based on qualitative assessments of Benefactor influence in Recipient countries along each of the 12 M-DIME instruments of influence. These assessments are made for the Benefactor's **Current Influence** (assessed as Very High, High, Medium, Low, Very Low, or Unobserved) and **Projected Influence** (assessed as Increasing, Steady, Decreasing, or Unknown). Current assessments are made based on activities from 2012 to the present, while future assessments are three-year forecasts.


The bulk of activities considered in the M-DIME Research Project involve members of the armed forces or defense sector personnel in both Benefactor and Recipient countries. Such activities include formal and informal military-to-military diplomacy, security cooperation engagements, and arms transfers. However, the M-DIME Research Project also tracks and analyzes Chinese and Russian activities that employ non-military instruments of influence but ultimately bear on the decision-making and capabilities of the Recipient country's armed forces. Such activities include Chinese and Russian collaboration with Benefactor states in media, communications technology, and strategic sectors.


The M-DIME Research Project's findings are derived from open-source research. Each M-DIME product is produced with the collaboration of analysts from across FMSO, frequently with the assistance of non-Department of Defense subject matter experts coming from academia, think tanks, and the private sector. Given its basis in open-source research, the M-DIME Research Project has an inherent limitation. It cannot track Chinese and Russian military influence activities that are deliberately kept secret. Consequently, assessments of Chinese and Russian influence based on instruments for which secrecy is important or where information would typically be classified by the Benefactor or Recipient countries—for instance, military-technology sharing or intelligence collaboration—are acknowledged to be made with low confidence. In certain cases, assessments are not made where open-source data is considered inconclusive.


In sum, the M-DIME Research Project is a tool for U.S. Army and U.S. Government personnel to better understand the instruments of national power employed by China and Russia to gain global military influence and the impact these activities have on U.S. national security interests. Over time, FMSO will expand the body of research and assessments based on this framework, increasing its comparative value across Benefactor and Recipient countries.

KEY ASSESSMENTS

Russia’s current M-DIME influence in Argentina is assessed as Low. Some of the most important instruments for Russia’s current military influence in Argentina include:


 **Defense-Related Diplomacy (D1).** In the past decade, high-level visits and meetings between Russia and Argentina have been frequent. The possibility of a closer defense-related relationship between Russia and Argentina holds implications for U.S. interests in the region, affecting areas such as economic partnerships, security cooperation, and regional stability.













 **Cultural and Media Outreach, Collaboration, and Alignment (I1).** The two countries have media cooperation agreements, and there is a significant Russian media presence in Argentina. Argentina’s populace generally holds a positive opinion of Russia. Also, Russian cultural organizations have a significant presence in Argentina, and senior Russian officials often write opinion pieces or are quoted in the local press.

 **Trade and Cooperation in Strategic Commodities/Sectors (E3).** Russia’s use of economic instruments to gain military influence in Argentina focuses on trade and cooperation in hydroelectric and nuclear energy, port construction, and the extraction of lithium, uranium, and oil. Notably, the Russian state-owned company Rosatom and its subsidiaries are involved in several joint resource extraction ventures in Argentina. Comprehensive cooperation in strategic sectors between Russia and Argentina is important since the South American country is a key trading partner for the United States.

Russia’s projected M-DIME influence in Argentina is assessed as Steady. Some of the most important instruments for Russia’s projected military influence in Argentina include:

 **Defense-Related Diplomacy (D1).** Despite Milei’s election, Russia will continue to support the development of bilateral relations with Argentina. This suggests that regular high-level visits and meetings, including those featuring heads of state, defense ministers, and military chiefs of staff, are expected to continue, remaining steady in Russia’s projected military influence in Argentina.

 **Cultural and Media Outreach, Collaboration, and Alignment (I1).** Russia’s use of cultural and media outreach in Argentina has been increasing since the Russia-Ukraine war. Argentina’s “soft” support for Ukraine is diplomatically important to Russia. The increasing presence of Russian media in Argentina, promoting Russia’s interests and criticizing the United States, may lead to a decrease in approval of the United States among the Argentine public.

DIPLOMATIC / INFORMATION			MILITARY / ECONOMIC					
	D1	Defense-Related Diplomacy		M1	Formal Bilateral Military Engagements			
	D2	International Military Education and Training		M2	Shared Informal/Multilateral Military Engagements			
	D3	Soft Power Activities		M3	Defense/Security Pacts and Agreements			
	I1	Cultural/Media Outreach, Collaboration, Alignment		E1	Arms Transfers			
	I2	Information/Communications Technology Support		E2	Technology-Sharing, Joint Production Agreements			
	I3	Cooperation in Military Intelligence/Communications		E3	Trade/Cooperation in Strategic Commodities/Sectors			
CURRENT DEGREE OF INFLUENCE			PROJECTED FUTURE DEGREE OF INFLUENCE					
Very High	High	Medium	Low	Very Low	None/Unobserved	Increasing 	Steady 	Decreasing 

INTRODUCTION TO RUSSIA-ARGENTINA MILITARY RELATIONS

Argentina has historically maintained a strong relationship with Russia, with longstanding economic, diplomatic, and security ties. Diplomatic relations between Argentina and the former Soviet Union (USSR) were established in 1946. During the Cold War, Argentina's governments often had tense relations with Moscow due to perceived Soviet support for leftist groups seen as threats by the nation's military leadership.¹ In the 1980s, however, Argentina significantly increased its grain exports to the Soviet Union when the United States suspended grain sales to the USSR. Additionally, U.S. support for the British position in the 1982 war for control of the Falklands/Malvinas Islands strengthened ties between the Argentine military government and the Soviet Union.² The USSR reportedly aided the South American country in the conflict by providing satellite surveillance of the British fleet.³ In 1986, President Raul Alfonsín made an official visit to Moscow, the first by an Argentine head-of-state. In the 21st century, under the Kirchner governments, political and economic ties between Russia and Argentina expanded. The 2004 agreement on military-technical cooperation between the two nations was a significant milestone. The importance of Argentina to Russia was underscored by then-President Medvedev's visit in April 2010, as well as visits by Argentine presidents to Russia in 1990, 1998, and 2008.⁴

Currently, military relations between Argentina and Russia are modest, and both countries prioritize military cooperation with other nations. Argentina is one of Latin America's largest economies and a key trading partner for the United States. The two countries share deep economic ties and have common interests in areas such as democracy, counterterrorism, energy, and technology infrastructure.⁵ Furthermore, Argentina has been a major non-NATO ally since 1998. Following President Mauricio Macri's 2015 election, his center-right administration increasingly sought military engagements with the United States. For instance, Macri signed an agreement with the United States for cybersecurity collaboration, and joint military exercises involving the Argentine and U.S. armed forces took place in 2017 and 2018.⁶ However, President Alberto Fernández's center-left administration, which came to power in 2019, scaled back bilateral and multilateral military cooperation with the United States. Military relations between Argentina and Russia in the next three years will depend on the foreign policy direction of newly elected President Javier Milei. Despite being a political outsider, Milei has aligned himself with traditional center-right parties and has previously expressed intentions to politically distance Argentina from Russia.⁷

ARGENTINA AT A GLANCE	
Capital	Buenos Aires ⁸
Population	46,621,847 (2023 est.) ⁹
GDP per Capita	\$21,500 (2021 est.) ¹⁰
Head of Government	President Javier Gerardo Milei ¹¹
Head of State	President Javier Gerardo Milei ¹²
Minister of Defense	Luis Petri ¹³
Chief of General Staff	General Juan Martín Paleo ¹⁴
Military Expenditure (total)	\$2577.58 million (2022) ¹⁵
Military Expenditure (% of GDP)	0.4% of GDP (2022) ¹⁶
Armed Service Branches	Army, Navy, Air Force, National Gendarmerie, Coast Guard ¹⁷
Active Armed Forces Personnel	80,000 (2023) ¹⁸

D - Diplomatic Instruments

Russia's use of diplomatic instruments to exert military influence in Argentina is deep in defense-related diplomacy but limited in other areas. Most notably, there have been frequent high-level visits and meetings involving heads of state, defense ministers, and military chiefs of staff. Official reports also confirm shared military participation in standard soft power activities, such as humanitarian missions, military attaché activities, and athletic events. However, military education exchanges have not been observed despite a recent agreement that permits Argentine soldiers to attend Russian military academies.



D1 - Defense-Related Diplomacy

Current Influence: High

Projected Influence: Steady

- ***There has historically been regular contact between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Argentina's various heads of state, regardless of political persuasion.***
 - » In February 2022, Putin met with President Alberto Fernández in Russia.¹⁹ Additionally, Putin spoke with Fernández over the phone in December 2022 and April 2021.^{20 21} The talks primarily focused on boosting political, economic, and cultural ties.
 - » Putin met with President Mauricio Macri in Argentina in January 2018 and December 2018,^{22 23} as well as in Russia in July 2018.²⁴ Putin met with President Cristina Fernández in Russia in April 2015²⁵ and in Argentina in July 2014.²⁶
- ***Russian military and defense officials have visited Argentina on a few occasions.***
 - » In February 2021, a Russian delegation from the Federal Service for Military and Technical Cooperation, along with representatives from various Russian companies, met with Argentina's Defense Minister Agustín Rossi in Buenos Aires. The meeting focused on bilateral military-technical cooperation and involved representatives from the Argentine Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces, including the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Representatives from multiple Argentine state-owned enterprises, such as an aircraft manufacturer (Fábrica Argentina de Aviones), an arms manufacturer (Fabricaciones Militares Sociedad del Estado), a shipyard (TANDANOR), and the Institute of Scientific and Technical Research for Defense, also participated.²⁷
 - » In December 2017, Secretary of Russia's Security Council, Nikolai Patrushev, visited Argentina and met with President Macri, Minister of Defense Oscar Aguad, Secretary of Strategic Affairs Fulvio Pompeo, and other government officials. The talks focused on increasing military-technical cooperation and signing a police intelligence-sharing agreement between the Argentine Ministry of Security and the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs.²⁸
 - » In July 2016, Argentine Minister of Defense Julio Martínez met with Army General Oleg Salyukov, Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Ground Forces, in Argentina. They discussed the necessity of acquiring new equipment for the Argentine Armed Forces and exchanging knowledge on counterterrorism and cybersecurity defense. Martínez was accompanied by the Secretary of Strategy and Military Affairs, Ángel Tello, as well as the heads of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces: Army Major General Bari del Valle Sosa, Army Major General Diego Suárez, and Navy Vice Admiral Marcelo Srur.²⁹
- ***Argentine military and defense officials have also visited Russia on a few occasions.***
 - » In 2017, an Argentine delegation from the Ministry of Defense met with their Russian counterparts in Saint Petersburg. The meeting focused on bilateral military-technical cooperation.³⁰
 - » In April 2015, Minister of Defense Rossi, met with his Russian counterpart, Sergei Shoigu. The talks centered on military and military-technical cooperation, as well as global and regional security issues.³¹
- ***No data exists to suggest that high-level visits and meetings will either decrease or increase over the next three years. Instead, Russia's influence via this instrument is likely to remain steady during this period.***

**D2 - International Military Education and Training****Current Influence: Very Low****Projected Influence: Steady**

- **Overall, virtually no engagement with this instrument was observed, with the notable exception of a military academy agreement and a 2012 helicopter training program.**
 - » In December 2021, the Argentine Ministry of Defense signed an agreement with the Russian Ministry of Defense that allows members of the Argentine Armed Forces to receive training in Russian military academies. The training included language courses, flight training for pilots, tactical diver courses, precision shooter courses, and more;³² however, we have seen no evidence of Argentina following through with participation in Russian military training.
 - » In February 2012, Argentine pilots completed training in Russia on flying Mi-171E helicopters. The report mentioned that the Russian military would conduct the next training course in Buenos Aires, but there is no evidence of this happening.³³
- **There are minimal references to military education exchanges between Russia and Argentina, and this very low frequency is expected to remain steady over the next three years.**

**D3 - Soft Power Activities****Current Influence: Medium****Projected Influence: Steady**

- **Russia and Argentina have participated in multiple shared military-diplomatic athletic events.**
 - » In August 2022, Argentina participated in the International Military Sports Council's Military World Cadet Games held in Saint Petersburg.³⁴
 - » In July 2016, the Argentine Army parachute team participated in an athletic event in Russia.³⁵
 - » In February 2016, an athletic event between Russian and Argentine police officers occurred in Buenos Aires, with the Russian delegation led by Deputy Interior Minister Igor Zubov.³⁶
- **There are some soft power activities involving high-level military personnel and the Russian Embassy in Argentina.**
 - » In February 2020, the Chief of the Argentine Federal Police, Juan Carlos Hernández, attended a cultural event at the Russian Embassy and met with the Russian military attaché, Colonel Vyacheslav O. Safrónov.³⁷
 - » In February 2020, the Russian Ambassador in Argentina visited Tierra del Fuego Province, met with the Commander of the Southern Naval Area of Argentina, and laid a wreath at the Monument to the Fallen in the Falklands.³⁸
- **Official reports confirm shared military participation in other standard soft power activities, such as military-technical forums, humanitarian missions, and naval refueling stops.**
 - » In December 2021, the Argentine Secretary of International Affairs for Defense met in Russia with officials from the Russian Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation and Rosoboronexport, which is a Russian state organization responsible for exporting the entire range of military, dual-use products and services and technologies).³⁹
 - » In January 2018, the Russian Navy assisted in the search for a missing Argentine Navy submarine.⁴⁰
 - » In January 2016, the Russian polar ship Vasilii Golovnin refueled 13 Argentine bases in Antarctica.⁴¹
 - » At the International Military-Technical Forum "ARMY-2016" in Russia, Argentine Minister of Defense Martínez met with his Russian counterpart, Shoigu, about military-technical cooperation between the two nations.⁴²
- **Standard soft power activities will likely continue steadily over the next three years based on consistently warm relations between Russia and Argentina, regardless of the administration in power.**

I - Informational Instruments

Russia's use of informational instruments to establish military influence in Argentina is primarily focused on cultural and media outreach. Notably, there are multiple media cooperation agreements and a significant Russian media presence in Argentina, contributing to generally positive public opinion toward Russia in the country. Joint statements of collaboration exist in space, ICT, and satellite communications, but no concrete evidence of collaboration has been observed. Furthermore, there is only one known intelligence-sharing agreement between Argentina and Russia.



I1 - Cultural and Media Outreach, Collaboration, and Alignment

Current Influence: High

Projected Influence: Increasing

- **Russia and Argentina have media cooperation agreements, and there is a significant Russian media presence in Argentina, contributing to generally positive public opinion toward Russia in the country.**
 - » Argentina and Russia signed media cooperation agreements in February 2019⁴³ and October 2016.⁴⁴
 - » Since October 2014, the Argentine government has allowed RT-Russia Today to broadcast on public television. More than 85 percent of Argentine homes can access the free 24-hour RT channel in Spanish.⁴⁵
 - » As of 2022, Argentina had the highest number of online readers in Latin America for RT's Spanish news website.⁴⁶
 - » In September 2022, a report suggested Argentine media frequently quoted Russian sources, including TASS, Ria Novosti, and Sputnik.⁴⁷
 - » In addition to state media, a U.S. State Department report suggested that the Kremlin is financing pro-Russia misinformation campaigns on Argentina's social media.⁴⁸
 - » According to the latest Latinobarómetro (2020), 52 percent of Argentines had a very favorable or somewhat favorable opinion of Russia.⁴⁹
- **Senior Russian officials often write opinion pieces or are quoted in the Argentine press, discussing topics that put Russia in a positive light and denigrate the United States and the West.**
 - » The Russian Ambassador to Argentina has published multiple articles in the Argentine weekly Perfil, including in September 2023,⁵⁰ August 2023,⁵¹ May 2023,⁵² March 2023,⁵³ April 2022.⁵⁴ Some of the main topics include Argentina's potential BRICS membership, "neo-Nazism" in Ukraine, criticism of American economic policies, and arguments that America is "prolonging" the Russia-Ukraine war.
 - » The Russian Ambassador also published articles in Argentine online publication Noticias Urbanas in November 2022⁵⁵ and Argentina's leading conservative daily La Nación in March 2022,⁵⁶ and he had interviews broadcast on public television in November 2019⁵⁷ and December 2016.⁵⁸
- **Russian cultural organizations have a significant presence in Argentina.**
 - » Casa de Rusia in Buenos Aires frequently hosts cultural events and offers Russian language courses in Argentina. It is affiliated with the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.⁵⁹
 - » In 2018, the University of Buenos Aires opened a Russian Center through an agreement signed with the Ruskiy Mir Foundation, a Russian government-sponsored organization.⁶⁰
- **Russia's use of cultural and media outreach in Argentina has increased since the start of the Russia-Ukraine war. Russia's cultural and media outreach is expected to increase further in the next three years because Argentina's "soft" support for Ukraine is diplomatically important to Russia.**

**I2 - Information and Communications Technology (ICT) Support****Current Influence: Very Low****Projected Influence: Decreasing**

- **Russia and Argentina have joint statements of collaboration in space, ICT, and satellite communications, but no concrete evidence of such collaboration has been observed.**
 - » In October 2019, Russia and Argentina signed a space cooperation protocol. It covers remote sensing of the Earth from space, satellite communications, satellite navigation, space geodesy and meteorology, space biology and medicine, utilization of spacecraft, and the organization of professional training and retraining, among other areas.⁶¹
 - » In May 2018, Argentina's Ministry of Science, Technology, and Innovation organized a meeting with a Russian delegation to enhance collaboration in health, information and communication technologies, and satellites. Potential investments were made by the Russian state-affiliated Skolkovo Foundation in Argentina.⁶²
 - » In April 2015, Putin and Cristina Fernández signed agreements related to space cooperation.⁶³
- **Statements of collaboration in space, ICT, and satellite communications are anticipated to decrease in the next three years given recent economic troubles in Argentina, Milei's intentions to politically distance Argentina from Russia, and sanctions on Russian enterprises.**

**I3: Cooperation in Military Intelligence and Communications****Current Influence: Unobserved****Projected Influence: Unknown**

- **There is no publicly available information about Russian cooperation with Argentina in military intelligence and communications programs during the relevant time period.**
- **Projected Russian influence via this instrument is unknown because of the lack of observed activities.**

M - Military Instruments

Russia's use of military instruments to establish greater influence in Argentina is apparent, although not particularly extensive. There is no evidence of formal bilateral military engagements. The countries collaborate on various UN peacekeeping missions, which offer Russia little real influence. Additionally, while Russia and Argentina have signed a few nonbinding bilateral security or defense cooperation agreements, none have been signed in the past six years.



M1: Formal Bilateral Military Engagements

Current Influence: Unobserved

Projected Influence: Unknown

- *There is no publicly available information about Russian engagement with Argentina in bilateral military engagements during the relevant time period.*
- *Projected Russian influence via this instrument is unknown because of the lack of observed activities.*



M2: Shared Informal/Multilateral Military Engagements

Current Influence: Very Low

Projected Influence: Steady

- *The only evidence of collaboration between military troops and security personnel from Russia and Argentina is on UN peacekeeping missions. However, this type of collaboration provides Russia with very little influence in Argentina due to its remote and multilateral nature.*
 - » Experts, police officers, and military troops from Russia and Argentina have collaborated on UN peacekeeping missions in Cyprus,⁶⁴ Jerusalem,⁶⁵ Western Sahara,⁶⁶ South Sudan,⁶⁷ and the Central African Republic.⁶⁸
- *There is no data to suggest a change in the frequency of multilateral military engagements between Russia and Argentina over the next three years. Overlap in UN peacekeeping missions is expected to remain steady during this period.*



M3: Defense/Security Pacts and Agreements

Current Influence: Low

Projected Influence: Steady

- *Russia and Argentina have signed a few nonbinding bilateral security or defense cooperation agreements, yet none have been signed in the past six years, signaling limited Russian influence via this instrument.*
 - » In December 2017, Russia and Argentina signed a memorandum of cooperation that involves regular consultations and the exchange of opinions on strategic issues of mutual interest related to regional and international security, such as countering international terrorism; illegal drug, weapon, and human trafficking; cybercrimes; and money laundering.⁶⁹
 - » In April 2015, Russia and Argentina signed a military cooperation agreement encompassing weapon supplies and joint training.⁷⁰
- *Russia's military influence in Argentina through this instrument is likely to persist at its current level during the next three years given the existing nonbinding bilateral agreements and lack of any signs of newer, more substantial defense/security pacts between the two countries.*

E - Economic Instruments

Russia's use of economic instruments to gain military influence in Argentina focuses on trade and cooperation in hydroelectric and nuclear energy, port construction, and the extraction of lithium, uranium, and oil. However, Russia and Argentina are not reliant on each other. While there are some agreements, there is no evidence of collaboration by Russia to jointly assemble, co-produce, or license the production of weapons in Argentina. There is no evidence of arms transfers.



E1: Arms Transfers

Current Influence: Unobserved

Projected Influence: Unknown

- ***There have been no weapons exports from Russia to Argentina since 2011, according to the arms transfer database of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.⁷¹ Argentina primarily imports weapons from the United States and France.***
- ***Projected Russian influence via this instrument is unknown because of the lack of observed activities.***



E2: Technology-Sharing and Joint Production Agreements

Current Influence: Very Low

Projected Influence: Decreasing

- ***Discussions have occurred between Russia and Argentina to jointly assemble anti-aircraft weapons in Argentina, but no evidence of actual collaboration has been observed.***
 - » In February 2022, the Russian government offered to manufacture anti-aircraft weapons in Argentina.⁷²
- ***It is expected that agreements between Russia and Argentina for the joint assembly, co-production, or licensing of weapons systems in Argentina will decrease over the next three years as a result of the recent economic sanctions on Russia.***
 - » For instance, there was an agreement between the two governments for Russia to provide maintenance for Russian-made military transport helicopters. However, the Argentine Air Force terminated the contract in August 2023 due to the sanctions.⁷³



E3: Trade and Cooperation in Strategic Commodities/Sectors

Current Influence: Medium

Projected Influence: Decreasing

- ***Strategic resource extraction ventures by the state-owned company Rosatom and its subsidiaries are Russia's primary economic instrument for military influence in Argentina. Securing access to lithium, uranium, and other resources in Argentina strategically benefits Russia in important industries.***
 - » In December 2021, Russia and Argentina signed a contract for lithium extraction in Salta Province. The agreement involves the creation of a joint company with \$30 million in investments, primarily backed by Uranium One Group, a subsidiary of Rosatom.⁷⁴
 - » In January 2018, Putin and Macri signed a memorandum of understanding for uranium extraction in Argentina. The agreement involves investments of up to \$250 million by Uranium One Group.⁷⁵ This project was halted after Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2023.
 - » In July 2014, Putin signed an agreement for Rosatom's involvement in the construction of Argentina's nuclear Atucha III power plant.⁷⁶
- ***Cooperation extends to other strategic sectors, such as port construction, oil extraction, and hydroelectric power. Russia could capitalize on this collaboration to enhance its military influence, given Argentina's dependence on foreign companies for these projects.***
 - » In December 2018, Gazprombank, a privately-owned Russian bank with close ties to the Kremlin, made plans to invest in the construction of a large port and logistics hub on the Parana River in Argentina.⁷⁷
 - » In April 2015, Putin and Cristina Fernández signed a memorandum of cooperation between Russian state-owned energy company Gazprom and Argentina's YPF National Corporation for oil and gas deposits, as well as a protocol of intent for the implementation of the multi-purpose Chihuido 1 Hydropower Project in Argentina.⁷⁸
 - » In April 2015, Russian state-owned development corporation VEB agreed to lend \$1.2 billion to a hydroelectric station project in Argentina.⁷⁹

- *Despite these economic ties, there are no significant export or import dependencies in strategic materials between Russia and Argentina, according to the Observatory of Economic Complexity.⁸⁰*
- *Large resource extraction ventures and cooperation in other strategic sectors between Russia and Argentina have declined since the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, signaling a potential trend where Russia loses its economic leverage within Argentina. Cooperation in strategic sectors is expected to decrease over the next three years.*



CONCLUSIONS

Russia's current M-DIME influence in Argentina is assessed as Low. Russia's current military influence in Argentina focuses on diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments. Diplomatically, high-level visits and meetings between Russia and Argentina, including heads of state, defense ministers, and military chiefs of staff, have been frequent (D1). Official reports also confirm shared military participation in standard soft power activities, such as humanitarian missions, military attaché activities, and athletic events (D3). The continuation of these activities strengthens Russian influence in Argentina, which has implications for U.S. interests in the region, such as economic partnerships, security cooperation, and regional stability. In terms of informational instruments, there are multiple media cooperation agreements and a significant Russian media presence in Argentina, contributing to generally more positive public opinion toward Russia than toward the United States in the country (I1). Finally, Russia's use of economic instruments to gain military influence in Argentina focuses on trade and cooperation in hydroelectric and nuclear energy, port construction, and the extraction of lithium, uranium, and oil (E3). Notably, the Russian state-owned company Rosatom and its subsidiaries are involved in several joint resource extraction ventures in Argentina. Trade in strategic sectors between Russia and Argentina is important since the South American country is a key trading partner for the United States.

Russia's projected M-DIME influence in Argentina is assessed as Steady. In the next three years, Russian military influence in Argentina is expected to focus on informational and diplomatic instruments. The ongoing significance of Argentina to Russia, particularly in the context of the Russia-Ukraine war, implies that Russia's use of cultural and media outreach in the South American country is likely to intensify over the next three years (I1). For example, Moscow could seek to expand media cooperation agreements between the two nations and bolster its media presence in Argentina. This heightened Russian media presence in Argentina, aimed at advancing Russian interests and criticizing the United States, risks a growing disapproval of the United States among the Argentine public. In terms of diplomatic instruments, regular high-level visits and meetings between Russia and Argentina, including those featuring heads of state, defense ministers, and military chiefs of staff, will likely persist, remaining steady in frequency over the coming three years (D1). A potential increase in Russian influence could undermine U.S. interests in the region, such as economic partnerships, security cooperation, and regional stability.

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