

# **FMSO's Military DIME (M-DIME) Research Project**

*Tracking Russian and Chinese military influence in states around the world*

## **Instruments of Russian Military Influence in Indonesia**

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## OVERVIEW OF FMSO'S M-DIME RESEARCH PROJECT

The Military DIME (M-DIME) Research Project is a dynamic effort from researchers at the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command's Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO). Its goal is to provide Army leaders with a clear, comparative understanding of how China and Russia employ instruments of national power to obtain military influence around the world. The M-DIME framework is derived from the "DIME" concept, which classes instruments of national power into four types: Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Economic. Based on this concept, the M-DIME framework gives more narrow attention to the instruments that China and Russia employ to gain military influence in third-party countries.

The M-DIME framework's purpose is to track and analyze the military influence of "Benefactor" countries (i.e. China and Russia) in select "Recipient" countries in Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, and South and Southeast Asia. Benefactor countries are assumed to engage in activities that result in them having increased military influence in Recipient countries to gain leverage over global rivals, competitors, and adversaries; for China and Russia, this means the United States. Within this framework, "military influence" is defined as the ability of a Benefactor country to shape or alter the attitudes, behaviors, and capabilities of actors within—and entities associated with—the armed forces of Recipient countries.

**The M-DIME framework identifies 12 distinct instruments of national power employed by Benefactor countries to gain military influence in Recipient countries, three for each of the DIME categories. They are as follows:**

### DIPLOMATIC INSTRUMENTS

- D1 Defense-Related Diplomacy
- D2 International Military Education and Training
- D3 Soft Power Activities

### INFORMATIONAL INSTRUMENTS

- I1 Cultural and Media Outreach, Collaboration, and Alignment
- I2 Information and Communications Technology (ICT) Support
- I3 Cooperation in Military Intelligence and Communications

### MILITARY INSTRUMENTS

- M1 Formal Bilateral Military Engagements
- M2 Shared Informal/Multilateral Military Engagements
- M3 Defense/Security Pacts and Agreements

### ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS

- E1 Arms Transfers
- E2 Technology-Sharing and Joint Production Agreements
- E3 Trade and Cooperation in Strategic Commodities/Sectors

M-DIME analysis is based on qualitative assessments of Benefactor influence in Recipient countries along each of the 12 M-DIME instruments of influence. These assessments are made for the Benefactor's **Current Influence** (assessed as Very High, High, Medium, Low, Very Low, or Unobserved) and **Projected Influence** (assessed as Increasing, Steady, Decreasing, or Unknown). Current assessments are made based on activities from 2012 to the present, while future assessments are three-year forecasts.

The bulk of activities considered in the M-DIME Research Project involve members of the armed forces or defense sector personnel in both Benefactor and Recipient countries. Such activities include formal and informal military-to-military diplomacy, security cooperation engagements, and arms transfers. However, the M-DIME Research Project also tracks and analyzes Chinese and Russian activities that employ non-military instruments of influence but ultimately bear on the decisionmaking and capabilities of the Recipient country's armed forces. Such activities include Chinese and Russian collaboration with Benefactor states in media, communications technology, and strategic sectors.

The M-DIME Research Project's findings are derived from open-source research. Each M-DIME product is produced with the collaboration of analysts from across FMSO, frequently with the assistance of non-Department of Defense subject matter experts coming from academia, think tanks, and the private sector. Given its basis in open-source research, the M-DIME Research Project has an inherent limitation. It cannot track Chinese and Russian military influence activities that are deliberately kept secret. Consequently, assessments of Chinese and Russian influence based on instruments for which secrecy is important or where information would typically be classified by the Benefactor or Recipient countries—for instance, military-technology sharing or intelligence collaboration—are acknowledged to be made with low confidence. Assessments of

**Projected Influence**, unless otherwise stated, are also made with low confidence given pervasive information gaps and the potential for bilateral dynamics to quickly shift. In certain cases, assessments are not made where open-source data is considered inconclusive

In sum, the M-DIME Research Project is a tool for U.S. Army and U.S. Government personnel to better understand the instruments of national power employed by China and Russia to gain global military influence and the impact these activities have on U.S. national security interests. Over time, FMSO will expand the body of research and assessments based on this framework, increasing its comparative value across Benefactor and Recipient countries.

## KEY ASSESSMENTS
















DIPLOMATIC / INFORMATION			MILITARY / ECONOMIC					
	<b>D1</b>	Defense-Related Diplomacy			<b>M1</b>	Formal Bilateral Military Engagements		
	<b>D2</b>	International Military Education and Training			<b>M2</b>	Shared Informal/Multilateral Military Engagements		
	<b>D3</b>	Soft Power Activities			<b>M3</b>	Defense/Security Pacts and Agreements		
	<b>I1</b>	Cultural/Media Outreach, Collaboration, Alignment			<b>E1</b>	Arms Transfers		
	<b>I2</b>	Information/Communications Technology Support			<b>E2</b>	Technology-Sharing, Joint Production Agreements		
	<b>I3</b>	Cooperation in Military Intelligence/Communications			<b>E3</b>	Trade/Cooperation in Strategic Commodities/Sectors		
CURRENT DEGREE OF INFLUENCE			PROJECTED FUTURE DEGREE OF INFLUENCE					
Very High	High	Medium	Low	Very Low	None/Unobserved	Increasing 	Steady 	Decreasing 

Figure 1. M-DIME Overview

**Russia's current M-DIME influence in Indonesia is assessed as Low.** Some of the most important instruments contributing to Russia's current military influence in Indonesia include:



**Defense-Related Diplomacy (D1).** Russia and Indonesia's heads of state and top defense officials have met frequently since 2012, driving the two countries' closer defense cooperation and engagement.



**Cultural and Media Outreach, Influence and Alignment (I1).** Russian media officials have been successful in pushing pro-Russian narratives on the war in Ukraine, with Russia perceived positively among many Indonesians.

**Russia's projected M-DIME influence in Recipient is assessed as Steady.** Some of the most dynamic instruments informing Russia's projected military influence in Indonesia include:



**Cultural and Media Outreach, Influence and Alignment (I1).** Russia's favorability in Indonesian public opinion seems unlikely to decline, bolstered by Russian media's local promotion of pro-Kremlin narratives.



**Trade and Cooperation in Strategic Commodities/Sectors (E3).** Russia's influence in strategic Indonesian sectors is expected to suffer in the next three years, as economic sanctions restrict Russian projects, like a major oil refinery, from advancing.

INDONESIA AT A GLANCE	
<b>Capital</b>	Jakarta <sup>1,a</sup>
<b>Population</b>	281,562,465 (2023 Estimate) <sup>2</sup>
<b>GDP per Capita</b>	\$12,400 (2022 Estimate) <sup>3</sup>
<b>Head of Government</b>	Prabowo Subianto <sup>4</sup>
<b>Head of State</b>	Prabowo Subianto <sup>5</sup>
<b>Minister of Defense</b>	Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin <sup>6</sup>
<b>Chief of General Staff</b>	Agus Subiyanto <sup>7</sup>
<b>Military Expenditure (total)</b>	\$9,384 Billion (2022 Estimate) <sup>8</sup>
<b>Military Expenditure (% of GDP)</b>	0.7% (2023 Estimate) <sup>9</sup>
<b>Armed Service Branches</b>	Army (TNI-Angkatan Darat, or TNI-AD) Navy (TNI-Angkatan Laut, or TNI-AL); includes Marine Corps (Korps Marinir, or KorMar) Air Force (TNI-Angkatan Udara, or TNI-AU) <sup>10</sup>
<b>Active Armed Forces Personnel</b>	Approximately 400,000 active-duty troops (300,000 Army; 60,000 Navy, including about 20,000 marines; 30,000 Air Force) (2023) <sup>11</sup>

a In 2022, the construction of a new capital called Nusantara was announced. It is expected to be completed by 2045.

Figure 2. Indonesia at a Glance.

## INTRODUCTION TO RUSSIA-INDONESIA RELATIONS

Russo-Indonesian military relations have fluctuated throughout history, influenced by geopolitical shifts and internal political dynamics. Cooperation emerged early, with the Soviet Union providing diplomatic backing to Indonesia's struggle against Dutch colonial rule in the 1940s.<sup>12</sup> Ties between the Soviet Union and Indonesia reached their zenith during the 1950s and 1960s under President Sukarno, Indonesia's founding leader and first president.<sup>13</sup> During this period, the Soviet Union provided substantial military aid and diplomatic support for Indonesia's claims over West Irian (Western New Guinea).<sup>14</sup> A significant pivot occurred following a 1965 coup attempt blamed on the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI), which paved the way for General Suharto to seize power and establish an authoritarian regime that ruled Indonesia until 1998. Under him, Indonesia curtailed its relationship with the Soviet Union and oriented

itself toward the West, driven by a desire to limit communist influence domestically.<sup>15</sup> Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, there was a limited expansion in Russia-Indonesia relations.<sup>16</sup>

This dynamic shifted after the United States imposed an arms embargo on Indonesia in 1991, which was subsequently tightened and joined by the European Union in 1999, citing human rights concerns in East Timor.<sup>17, 18</sup> In response, Indonesia enhanced its military cooperation with Russia and, in 2003, purchased Sukhoi aircraft and made plans for joint defense production.<sup>19</sup> Despite the lifting of the U.S. military embargo in 2006,<sup>20</sup> Russia has retained its significance in Indonesia's military modernization efforts.<sup>21</sup> Indonesia continues to acquire and use Russian aircraft, contributing to a diversified security force that helps insulate the country against potential sanctions from the West

in the future.<sup>22, 23</sup> Furthermore, the 2002 Bali terrorist bombings reinforced Indonesia's awareness of security vulnerabilities, leading to closer counterterrorism cooperation with both Western nations and Russia.<sup>24</sup>

U.S. policy has emphasized the importance of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), of which Indonesia is a member, as essential in ensuring a free and open Indo-Pacific.<sup>25, 26</sup> The United States has enhanced the potential for economic, cultural, and defense collaboration after elevating its relationship with Indonesia to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in November 2023 and later signing a Defense Cooperation Agreement, formalizing broad and deep bilateral engagement.<sup>27, 28</sup> The U.S. military relationship with Indonesia includes significant arms transfers (like F-15 fighter jets and Black Hawk helicopters),<sup>29, 30</sup> the development of a joint maritime

training center,<sup>31</sup> and regular joint military exercises.<sup>32</sup> Russia has attempted to expand its military presence in Southeast Asia, where Chinese influence is preeminent, primarily through arms sales.<sup>33</sup> However, overall arms sales in the region have declined in recent years, despite some continued interest in Russian imports from Indonesian officials.<sup>34, 35</sup> Southeast Asia is not the primary focus of Russia's efforts to extend its military influence in the Indo-Pacific; instead, it is centered on developing its relationship with China amid international pressure following its invasion of Ukraine.<sup>36</sup> Although Russia prioritizes developing its relationship with China, the United States is wary of Russia's endeavors in Indonesia and has sought to constrain its influence and prevent and deter arms transfers between the two countries.<sup>37, 38</sup>

## D - Diplomatic Instruments

Russia maintains a medium level of influence in its military relationship with Indonesia through occasional diplomatic meetings between top defense officials. Naval port calls and refueling stops play a minor but supportive role in developing soft power for Russia. Although numerous references to training programs have been made in official meetings between Russian and Indonesian officials, there is limited information on their substance.



### D1: Defense-Related Diplomacy

**Current Influence: Medium**

**Projected Influence: Steady**

- **Russian and Indonesian heads of state have met twice since 2012.**
  - » In 2016, President Joko Widodo met his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, in Sochi.<sup>39</sup> The two leaders agreed to improve intelligence sharing to combat terrorism; President Widodo stressed the need for cooperation outside of arms transfers, in areas such as military training, technology transfer, and joint production.<sup>40, 41</sup>
  - » In June 2022, President Widodo visited President Putin in Moscow on a peace mission over the Ukraine war, though talks were publicly stated to be limited to economic issues.<sup>42, 43</sup> Whether discussions took place over bilateral defense relations and developments is unknown.
- **Senior Indonesian and Russian defense officials have held several high-level meetings since 2012.**
  - » In 2017<sup>44</sup> and 2019,<sup>45</sup> former Defense Minister Ryamizard Ryacudu met with Russian defense officials in Moscow to procure Sukhoi aircraft and enhance defense cooperation via intelligence-sharing and training.
  - » In January 2020, then-Indonesian Defense Minister Prabowo Subianto met with former Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and other defense industry officials in Russia.<sup>46</sup> The meeting reportedly focused on arms procurement for the modernization of Indonesia's military.<sup>47</sup>
  - » In June 2020, Prabowo visited Russia and met with Russian Deputy Defense Minister Alexander Fomin.<sup>48</sup> The talks focused on the procurement of Sukhoi Su-35 fighters, joint training, defense industry cooperation, and military education.<sup>49, 50</sup>
  - » In February 2025, Shoigu visited Indonesia to enhance defense engagement, but specifics of the discussion were not reported.<sup>51</sup>
- **Russia's influence via high-level military diplomacy is expected to remain steady over the next three years. Current President Prabowo Subianto has stated his intention to enhance ties with Russia.**
  - » As president-elect, Subianto met with Putin in August 2024, hoping for stronger cooperation on numerous issues such as defense.<sup>52</sup>
  - » President Subianto stated, "I would like to continue to maintain and enhance this relationship. In our history, we remember Russia has always helped us in many aspects when we were in difficulties."





## D2: International Military Education and Training Programs

### Current Influence: Unobserved

### Projected Influence: Unknown

- **Indonesian officials have stressed the need for continued and further cooperation with Russia over military training and education, but public information over the quantity and level of these programs is limited.**
  - » In 2016, during a visit to Russia, President Widodo encouraged further military training and education programs between the two countries, but no specifics were given.<sup>53</sup>
  - » Defense Ministers Ryacudu and Subianto discussed further bilateral cooperation in military training with Russian defense officials in 2019<sup>54</sup> and 2020, respectively.<sup>55</sup> No further details about developments of the talks are available.
  - » In 2022, Indonesia's Ambassador to Russia, Jose Tavares, claimed that Indonesian officers train in Russia but provided no details.<sup>56</sup>
- **Projected Russian influence via this instrument is unknown because of the lack of observed activities.**
  - » Continued bilateral meetings between Russian and Indonesian defense officials will likely include references to education and training programs.

## D3: Soft Power Activities



### Current Influence: Low

### Projected Influence: Steady

- **The Russian Navy has conducted multiple port calls and refueling stops in Indonesian ports, garnering limited influence through interactions between Indonesian and Russian military personnel.**
  - » In 2016, a detachment from Russia's Pacific Fleet docked in the port of Tanjung Priok in Jakarta to participate in the Indo Defense Expo & Forum, which hosts foreign delegates and representatives from defense industries on a biennial basis.<sup>57, 58</sup>
  - » In 2017, a Pacific Fleet detachment docked in Tanjung Priok port as Russian and Indonesian servicemen took part in sport competitions.<sup>59</sup>
  - » In 2023, Russian vessels from the Pacific Fleet celebrated Russia Day in Tanjung Perak, and Indonesia hosted cultural festivities for Russian sailors.<sup>60</sup>
- **Russia's Emergencies Ministry has provided natural disaster relief and support for search and rescue operations in Indonesia, but records of Russian involvement are sporadic and limited.**
  - » In January 2015, the Emergencies Ministry dispatched personnel to help with search and rescue operations for an Indonesia AirAsia plane that crashed in the Java Sea.<sup>61, 62</sup>
  - » In October 2015, Russian planes assisted efforts to fight wildfires on the Indonesian islands of Sumatra and Kalimantan.<sup>63</sup>
  - » In 2018, the Emergencies Ministry sent an Il-76 with 23 tons of humanitarian supplies after the Indonesian island of Sulawesi was struck by a tsunami.<sup>64</sup>
- **Russian influence via military soft power activities is expected to remain steady over the next three years, likely continuing at current levels through port calls and refueling.**



# I - Informational Instruments

Russia employs various informational instruments for military influence, although none at high levels. Russian state-owned media has signed cooperation agreements with some of Indonesia's largest media outlets and hosted training programs for its journalists. Russian diplomats have actively sought to push pro-Russian narratives, particularly over the war in Ukraine, which has been received positively among popular and elite circles in Indonesia.



## I1: Cultural and Media Outreach, Collaboration, and Alignment

**Current Influence: Medium**

**Projected Influence: Steady**

- **Russian state-owned media has deep roots and established influence in Indonesia. Through cooperation agreements and training programs for journalists, Russian media has built strong relationships with major Indonesian outlets and their journalists.**

- » Russian state-owned media outlet *Sputnik* signed media cooperation agreements in 2015 with Indonesia's largest news agency, *Antara*,<sup>65</sup> and in 2017 with Indonesian media *Radio Republik Indonesia* and *JawaPos*.<sup>66</sup>
- » In 2023, *Sputnik* launched an intensive three-day course with 26 journalists from 15 countries, including journalists from Indonesian media outlets *Antara* and *Radio Republik Indonesia*,<sup>67</sup> where journalists attended workshops, learned how an international news agency operates, and connected with the "cultural life of Moscow."<sup>68</sup>
- » The Russian Mission to ASEAN announced in April 2024, *RT*, a pro-Kremlin media outlet, was hosting an academy to train aspiring and experienced journalists from ASEAN; out of 157 participants, 65 were Indonesian.<sup>69</sup>
- **Russian diplomats have frequently contributed to Indonesian media outlets, circulating Russian influence and narratives throughout Indonesia's media environment.**
- » In July 2023, Indonesian newspaper *Kompas* interviewed Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, who pushed Russia's narrative of the Ukraine war and highlighted Indonesia as a strategic partner.<sup>70, 71</sup>
- » Russian diplomats in Indonesia have published op-eds and been interviewed by Indonesian media, where they have highlighted pro-Russian narratives surrounding the war in Ukraine,<sup>72, 73</sup> broad bilateral cooperation,<sup>74</sup> and historic ties between the two countries.<sup>75</sup>

- **Indonesian views of Russia are generally positive, and a significant number of Indonesians have embraced pro-Russian narratives regarding the Ukraine War.**

- » A 2018 Pew Research Report found 46 percent of Indonesians hold a favorable view of Russia.<sup>76</sup> This figure has not significantly changed after the Ukraine War, with a 2023 Pew Research Report finding that 42 percent of Indonesians had a favorable view of Russia; out of 24 countries surveyed, Indonesia tied for holding the second highest favorable opinion of Russia (after India).<sup>77</sup>
- » The 2024 State of Southeast Asia survey, whose respondents are elites from Southeast Asia, found that around 69 percent of Indonesian respondents viewed the economic fallout to be the most serious impact of the Russia-Ukraine War.<sup>78</sup>

- » Many Indonesian academics and writers have pushed pro-Russian narratives<sup>79</sup> of the war in Ukraine, such as NATO enlargement as its root cause,<sup>80, 81</sup> calling Russia's invasion a special military operation,<sup>82</sup> and arguing that the West is hypocritical with its actions in Ukraine compared to Israel's war in Gaza.<sup>83</sup>
- **Russian influence via this instrument is expected to remain steady over the next three years. Russian media and diplomats have developed strong roots in Indonesia's media environment, reinforcing a positive view of Russia that is expected to remain strong.**



## 12: Information and Communications Technology (ICT) Support

**Current Influence: Very Low**

**Projected Influence: Steady**

- **Russia has devoted limited resources to this instrument, focusing primarily on space cooperation, as Russia seeks to assist in the construction of a spaceport in Biak.**
  - » In 2019, the director of the Russian state-owned space company Roscosmos claimed that negotiations were underway to send the first Indonesian cosmonaut to space.<sup>84</sup> The development of these talks is unknown.
  - » Roscosmos plans to assist with the construction of a launch site on the Indonesian island of Biak by 2024.<sup>85, 86</sup> The CIA estimates the Biak Spaceport will be completed by 2025.<sup>87</sup>
- **Russian influence via ICT support is expected to remain steady over the next three years. While high-profile, the spaceport initiative is narrowly focused and remains uncertain in both scope and implementation. It is the only meaningful area of bilateral ICT collaboration.**



## 13: Cooperation in Military Intelligence and Communications

**Current Influence: Very Low**

**Projected Influence: Steady**

- **Russia and Indonesia have signed a cooperation agreement on cyber intelligence sharing and have made references to antiterrorism intelligence cooperation.**
  - » In a 2016 visit to Russia by President Widodo, he and President Putin agreed to share intelligence to fight terrorism.<sup>88</sup>
  - » In 2017, Foreign Minister Lavrov visited Indonesia and announced that the two countries would increase cooperation to combat terrorist groups, including affiliates of the Islamic State.<sup>89</sup>
  - » In 2021, Russia and Indonesia signed a cooperation agreement that would see information exchanged between the two countries over cyberattacks and illegal use of ICT.<sup>90</sup>
- **Russian influence via military intelligence and communications cooperation is expected to remain steady over the next three years. Russia's ability to use this instrument is largely based on the threat of terrorism in Indonesia, which has been on the decline.**
  - » The Global Terrorism Index, developed by the Institute for Economics and Peace, indicates that efforts to combat terrorism in Indonesia have improved since the peak in 2018.<sup>91</sup>

## M - Military Instruments

Russia's use of military instruments to gain influence in Indonesia is limited. Bilateral military engagements are infrequent. Russia has consistently participated in multilateral naval exercises hosted by Indonesia, but the sheer size and number of participants in these exercises dilute the potential of Russia accruing any military influence. Formal defense agreements are also limited, and despite the continued Russian interest in elevating its relationship with Indonesia to a strategic partnership, an official proposal has yet to be signed.



### M1: Formal Bilateral Military Engagements

**Current Influence: Low**

**Projected Influence: Steady**

- ***Russia has had a handful of limited bilateral exercises with Indonesia, most recently a joint naval exercise in November 2024.***
  - » In December 2017, the Russian Air Force dispatched two T-95MS strategic bombers and two Il-76MD aircraft to Indonesia's Biak Airfield<sup>92</sup> to support a reported navigation exercise.<sup>93</sup>
  - » In December 2020, the Indonesian and Russian navies participated in an exercise, RUSINDO-20, involving three vessels from each side.<sup>94</sup> The objectives of the exercise were to improve training of military personnel, bilateral tactical cooperation, and interoperability between the two navies.<sup>95</sup>
  - » In November 2024, Indonesia and Russia held a naval exercise focused on maneuvering, search and rescue, and counterterrorism.<sup>96</sup>
- ***In one instance, there was a lack of follow-through on a proposed bilateral exercise between Indonesia and Russia.***
  - » In March 2020, the Russian Ministry of Defense announced preparations for a joint Russian and Indonesian naval exercise, called Orruda-2020.<sup>97</sup> The two sides reportedly agreed to a timeline and structure for the exercise, with limited specifics.<sup>98</sup> There is no report of those talks and agreements progressing into anything tangible.
- ***Russian influence via formal bilateral military engagements is expected to remain steady over the next three years, though such engagements are likely to be infrequent.***



### M2: Shared Informal/Multilateral Military Engagements

**Current Influence: Low**

**Projected Influence: Steady**

- ***Russia has consistently participated in naval exercises that either involve ASEAN or are hosted by Indonesia. However, the size and number of participants in multilateral naval exercises hosted by Indonesia dilute the potential for Russian military influence.***
  - » In 2014,<sup>99</sup> 2016,<sup>100</sup> 2018,<sup>101</sup> and 2023,<sup>102</sup> Russian naval forces participated in the Multilateral Naval Exercise Komodo (MNEK) hosted by Indonesia. MNEK seeks to improve maritime cooperation among states through non-warfighting exercises, such as humanitarian operations and disaster management.<sup>103</sup>
  - » In 2021, the ASEAN-Russia Naval Exercise (ARNEX) featured seven ASEAN member states,

including Indonesia, carrying out drills with the Russian Navy.<sup>104</sup> The ceremony and exercise took place in Indonesian waters, focusing on signals training, search and rescue, joint tactical maneuvering, and screening suspicious vessels.<sup>105, 106</sup>

- ***Russian influence via this instrument is expected to remain steady over the next three years. The MNEK is a biennial exercise that Russia can continue to participate in and maintain its current level of cooperation.***



### M3: Defense/Security Pacts and Agreements

**Current Influence: Very Low**

**Projected Influence: Steady**

- ***Russian officials have spoken of their relationship with Indonesia as a strategic partnership, though there is no specific document attesting to this.***
  - » In 2018,<sup>107</sup> 2020,<sup>108</sup> 2021,<sup>109</sup> and 2023,<sup>110</sup> Foreign Minister Lavrov stated that Russian and Indonesian relations have reached the level of a strategic partnership. However, they have yet to sign an official proposal.
- ***Russian influence via this instrument is expected to remain steady over the next three years. Despite continued interest and statements over the years, efforts to formally elevate the relationship to a strategic partnership appear to have lost momentum.***

## E - Economic Instruments

Russia's use of economic instruments to gain military influence in Indonesia is significant but lopsided, with the focus largely on arms transfers. Russia is Indonesia's sixth largest arms supplier and has sold fighter aircraft and armored vehicles to help modernize the Indonesian military. Although Indonesian law requires technology transfer in foreign arms deals, limited information is available on the results of this vis-à-vis transactions with Russia. Russian companies' involvement in Indonesian strategic sectors is limited, and some efforts have been hampered by economic sanctions.



### E1: Arms Transfers

**Current Influence: Low**

**Projected Influence: Steady**

- ***Since 2014, Indonesia has purchased Russian armored vehicles.***
  - » In 2019, Indonesia signed a contract for the procurement of 22 additional BMP-3Fs and 21 units of the BT-3F armored personnel carriers,<sup>111</sup> valued at around \$175 million.<sup>112</sup>
- ***Russia and Indonesia began discussions over the procurement of the Sukhoi Su-35 aircraft in 2014 and agreed on a contract in 2018.***
  - » In 2014,<sup>113</sup> Defense Minister Purnomo Yusgiantoro discussed purchasing Russian Su-35 fighters to replace the F-5 Tiger in its fleet.
  - » In 2018, a contract was signed for the procurement of eleven Su-35 fighters, with 50 percent being paid through the exports of Indonesian commodities.<sup>114, 115</sup> The deal was valued at \$1.14 billion.<sup>116</sup>
  - » Initial reports later claimed the deal had been canceled due to potential sanctions from the United States' Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act.<sup>117, 118</sup>
  - » In May 2024, Indonesia's Ambassador to Russia, Jose Tavares, claimed the deal was on hold until the situation was "more accommodating."<sup>119</sup>
- ***Russian influence via this instrument is expected to remain steady. Russian arms comprise an important component of the Indonesian military's armored vehicles and fighter aircraft. Although arms transfers between Russia and Indonesia have declined over the past decade, Indonesian authorities remain wary of overly relying on Western arms because of lessons drawn from the 1990s U.S. arms embargo on Indonesia, and as such Russia is likely to retain a market share in Indonesian arms procurement.***



### E2: Technology-Sharing and Joint Production Agreements

**Current Influence: Very Low**

**Projected Influence: Steady**

- ***Despite Indonesian law requiring offsets and technology sharing in arms deals to strengthen Indonesia's domestic defense industry, no details on this have been observed among open sources.***
  - » An Indonesian defense law mandates that offsets and technology sharing take place in foreign arms deals to build up Indonesia's domestic defense industry.<sup>120</sup>
  - » If the 2018 contract for Su-35 aircraft is ever finalized, it will allow Indonesia to construct a maintenance site and benefit from the technology transfer.<sup>121</sup>

- » In bilateral military-technical cooperation meetings<sup>122, 123, 124</sup> and meetings among top officials,<sup>125, 126</sup> there have been repeated references to the need for continued collaboration in joint production and technology sharing.
- **Russian influence via this instrument is expected to remain steady over the next three years. The Indonesian law mandating that technology transfer and offsets be part of foreign arms deals remains in effect.**



### E3: Trade and Cooperation in Strategic Commodities/Sectors

**Current Influence: Low**

**Projected Influence: Decreasing**

- **Russian energy company Rosneft pledged to invest significant funds for an oil refinery in Indonesia, but economic sanctions have impacted these efforts.**
  - » In 2016, it was announced that Rosneft would partner with Indonesian company Pertamina to construct the Tuban oil refinery in East Java, a joint investment valued at \$13.8 billion.<sup>127</sup>
  - » The project has stalled due to international sanctions on Russian companies.<sup>128, 129</sup>
- **Russian mining companies once exerted significant influence in Indonesia and successfully lobbied for an export ban to invest in downstream infrastructure in Indonesia, but their investment promises failed to materialize.**
  - » Russian mining companies have exerted strong influence in Indonesia. In 2014, their intense lobbying efforts pressured Indonesia to enact an export ban on unprocessed bauxite and nickel ore.<sup>130</sup>
  - » Russian companies like Rusal,<sup>131, 132</sup> Nor Nickel,<sup>133</sup> and Vi Holding suggested pledging billions to invest in Indonesia's mining sector for the processing of these minerals, but nothing materialized on these investment promises.<sup>134, 135</sup>
- **Russia has offered support to Indonesia in nuclear energy development, including the design of a small reactor near Jakarta, yet progress has been slow.**
  - » Russia has proposed assisting Indonesia in strengthening cooperation in energy through the development of a nuclear power plant.<sup>136, 137</sup>
  - » A Russian-designed 10 MWe experimental small modular reactor is planned to be built near Jakarta, with deployment envisaged in 2045.<sup>138, 139</sup>
- **Russian influence through this instrument is expected to decrease in the next three years. Cooperation is largely centered on the development of nuclear energy, and due to sanctions, Indonesia is considering replacing Rosneft.**<sup>140</sup>

## CONCLUSIONS

***Russia's current M-DIME influence in Indonesia is assessed as Low. Russia's use of Diplomatic and Informational instruments are key components in projecting its military influence in Indonesia.***

Capitalizing on Indonesia's strategic neutrality, Russia has successfully pushed pro-Kremlin narratives regarding the Ukraine war (I1), building a reservoir of public goodwill that complicates U.S. messaging. This is bolstered by frequent diplomatic engagements between defense officials (D1), which Russia uses to promote defense collaboration. However, Russia has largely failed to convert these soft power gains into hard power leverage. Crucially, its role as an arms supplier (E1) has diminished, with major deals faltering under the threat of sanctions. While Jakarta remains open to Russian equipment to diversify its arsenal—a direct lesson from the 1990s U.S. arms embargo—Moscow's inability to follow through on major defense initiatives keeps its actual military influence limited.

***Russia's projected M-DIME influence in Indonesia is assessed as Steady. Russia is expected to maintain key levers of Diplomatic and Informational influence, though its Economic influence is expected to decline.***

Indonesia is likely to continue diplomatic engagement with Russia (D1), including to procure Sukhoi fighter aircraft (E1). Elite and popular opinions of Russia remain broadly positive and have not been significantly harmed by the Ukraine War (I1). Russian companies may find it challenging to establish strong roots in Indonesia's strategic sectors, as large-scale projects such as the Tuban oil refinery stall due to Ukraine war-related sanctions (E3). Indonesia, as the world's third-largest democracy and a rising middle power, plays a crucial role in regional dynamics. Russia's ability to maintain certain levers of influence in the country remains a challenge for U.S. efforts to limit Moscow's reach.

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