

WAR IN UKRAINE

SOCIOCULTURAL RUNNING ESTIMATE

PERSPECTIVES ON PEACE



In This Running Estimate...

- Many Russians and Ukrainians support peace negotiations, yet they also support their respective war efforts.
- Ukrainians are skeptical of both Russia and President Trump regarding potential peace terms.
- A majority of Ukrainians and Europeans believe that a peace agreement will primarily benefit Russia.
- Most Ukrainians are determined to reclaim their territory occupied by Russia.
- Russian support for Putin remains high and Ukrainian support for Zelenskyy has steadily increased since his meeting with Trump in March.
- Most Europeans advocate for continued aid to Ukraine.




Figure 1: Russian-Ukrainian Perspectives on Peace and War.¹

PEACE & WAR SENTIMENTS

[I]t became obvious that the statements about the prospects [of a truce] are much more optimistic than the prospects themselves.

- Lev Shlosberg, Deputy Chairman of the Yabloko party (only Russian political party that openly opposes the SMO)²

What we see from [Putin's] actions: he continues to kill civilians, including children in Kyiv. So judging not by his words but his actions, he has no intentions to have any reliable, stable, sustainable ceasefire.

- Oleksandr Merezhko, head of the Ukrainian parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee and MP from Zelenskyy's Servant of the People party³

As in the past, it is now for Russia to show its willingness to achieve peace.

-EU statement on proposed 30-day ceasefire⁴

Not long ago I said we'd grind then [Ukraine] down—now it looks like we'll finish them off.”

-Russian President Vladimir Putin aboard nuclear submarine Arkhangelsk, March 2025⁶

Most people in Russia simply didn't care [about the war in Ukraine]—and they still don't...They saw [the invasion of Ukraine's Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts] as some small conflict in eastern Ukraine, maybe with some Russian soldiers involved, but they didn't recognize it as the coming of something horrific.

- Ekaterina Barabash, Exiled Russian film critic and journalist⁵

KEY JUDGMENT

The Russo-Ukraine war is a protracted conflict causing losses not seen since World War II and both sides are suffering from war weariness; however, Russia and Ukraine's seemingly intractable objectives and mutual distrust make the complexities of achieving peace a challenging endeavor, despite a widespread popular desire in both Ukraine and Russia to end the conflict.

An increasing majority of Russians support negotiations to end the war, reflecting a sense of war weariness, despite many of them still backing the special military operation (SMO). The Kremlin views external efforts to negotiate as opportunities to bolster political support through propaganda, showcasing Russian strength and resolve, rather than representing genuine concessions.

- As of April 2025, 61 percent of Russians support peace negotiations, which is consistent with levels seen in September 2024 and January 2025.⁷ This increase coincides with reported battlefield gains and increased foreign military assistance from North Korea and China,⁸ indicating growing war fatigue.
- There is a notable demographic divide in support. Younger, urban, and digitally-connected Russians favor negotiation, while older Russian citizens, who rely heavily on state-controlled television, continue to support the SMO.
- According to a March 2025 Russian field poll, 40 percent of Russians support a U.S.-proposed 30-day ceasefire, while 44 percent oppose it.⁹
- As of April 2025, 75 percent of Russians support the SMO, down from 80 percent in February, yet a nearly equal percentage want it to end. This trend suggests that while many Russians back the SMO’s objectives, there is also a significant level of fatigue related to the war and its associated sanctions.¹⁰

Since at least 2014, Russian aggression has led the Ukrainian people to largely distrust any Russian proposals for a resolution to the conflict. Ukrainians overwhelmingly want the war to end, but only under favorable conditions. An all-Ukrainian public opinion survey conducted in March 2025 by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS), revealed that 79 percent of Ukrainians reject Russian conditions for ending hostilities, which include Ukraine’s agreement not to join NATO, halting Ukrainian mobilization, stopping Western arms supplies, and ending the provision of intelligence to Kyiv. The same survey found 82 percent of respondents believe Ukraine should continue to fight for victory under any circumstances. As has been the case since the early months of the war, support for this position is stronger in the western portions of Ukraine compared to the east; although 78 percent of eastern Ukrainians believe fighting should continue regardless.¹³



RUSSIANS

SUPPORT NEGOTIATIONS¹¹

DEC 2024	54%
JAN 2025	61%
FEB 2025	59%
MAR 2025	58%
APR 2025	61%

SUPPORT THE SMO¹²

DEC 2024	76%
JAN 2025	78%
FEB 2025	80%
MAR 2025	79%
APR 2025	75%

- The survey found that 77 percent of Ukrainians support a U.S.-proposed 30-day ceasefire, while only 17 percent oppose it. However, 64 percent of Ukrainians reject a ceasefire that lacks security guarantees.
- Ukrainian support for various security measures includes: ¹⁴
 - » Sixty favor the deployment of Western peacekeepers (34 percent are opposed).
 - » Fifty-eight percent support NATO membership as a security guarantee (32 percent are opposed).
 - » Fifty-six percent advocate for increased lethal aid to Ukraine (35 percent are opposed).

- The survey presented six statements—three positive and three negative—from which respondents chose those that best fit their perception of the ceasefire proposal. Overall, 77 percent of respondents selected positive responses.¹⁵ In particular:
 - » Forty-seven percent chose the response that reflected a cynical view of Russia’s behavior: “A way to show that Russia does not want peace or that Russia always violates agreements.” That nearly half of respondents have a scornful view of Russia (and that the KIIS chose to write the response in this manner) suggests how Russian actions since 2014 have shaped Ukrainian perceptions.¹⁶
 - » In contrast, 30 percent chose the other two more objective, positive responses: “A step towards a real end to the war on terms acceptable to Ukraine” (18 percent) and “A way to unblock military aid from the USA” (12 percent).¹⁷

that an average of 52 percent believe peace terms will be more favorable to Russia, 19.5 percent expect a peace agreement to benefit Ukraine, and 23 percent foresee a neutral peace.¹⁹

- When it comes to potential brokers of a peace agreement, only 24 percent of Ukrainians believe that the United States seeks a just peace. In fact, the survey revealed that 67 percent of respondents believe the United States has grown weary of supporting Ukraine and is encouraging it to make concessions to Russia to more quickly end the war.²⁰ In contrast, 64 percent of Ukrainians believe Europe is committed to achieving a just peace.²¹

Perspectives on who will most benefit from a peace agreement:

WHO WILL GAIN FROM PEACE?			
	UKRAINE	RUSSIA	NEUTRAL
	18%	54%	21%
	19.5%	52%	23%

Most Ukrainians and Europeans believe that a peace agreement will benefit Russia. In March 2025, two nationwide surveys in Ukraine produced conflicting results regarding public opinion on the possibility of a “just peace.” One poll found that over 41 percent of Ukrainians believe in the possibility of a just peace. However, the second poll revealed that many Ukrainians expect any potential peace deal to favor Russia. Only 18 percent of respondents anticipated a peace agreement that would benefit Ukraine, while 21 percent expected a neutral peace agreement.¹⁸ A limited European poll conducted among respondents from Great Britain, France, Germany, and Poland showed

PERSPECTIVES ON RUSSIAN-OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

Of the [Ukrainian] population that remains here, 60-70 percent are waiting for the return of Ukraine. They still don't believe and don't want to believe that Russia has come for good."

-Teacher in Russian-occupied city of Berdyansk²²

We hope for a just peace, so that everyone can return home and reunite with their families. And so that Berdyansk becomes, as before, a Ukrainian city."

-Ukrainian resident of Berdyansk²³

...any attempts to recognize the temporarily occupied territory of the Crimean Peninsula as Russian—regardless of who makes such attempts and for what purpose—would constitute a gross violation of the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act, the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, numerous UN General Assembly resolutions, and other fundamental norms of international law."

-Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people²⁴


Since the Russian invasion in 2022, Ukrainians have remained determined to reclaim Ukrainian territory occupied by Russia. Signs of war-weariness are becoming apparent however, as support for regaining captured land has gradually declined since March 2022. A poll conducted in April–May 2025 revealed that 56.9 percent of Ukrainians are not willing to cede any territory to Russia

for peace with Russia, while only 11.1 percent are open to relinquishing land to end the war. Additionally, 82 percent of Ukrainians oppose any agreement that would designate the Russian-occupied oblasts of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia as part of Russia, and 80 percent oppose the withdrawal of Ukrainian armed forces from the four occupied regions.²⁵

STRATEGIC "BLAME GAME" POSITIONING

Both Ukraine and Russia position themselves to shift blame onto each other when peace talks fail. The Kremlin has instructed Russian media to downplay the likelihood of a truce, emphasizing that the United States has set unrealistic expectations and failed to reach an agreement with Zelenskyy, thus absolving Russia of any blame.²⁶

Presidential Popular Perspectives²⁷



Russian support for President Vladimir Putin has remained steady at 87 percent approval for the past six months,²⁸ demonstrating successful political stabilization following challenges in mid-2023 and late 2024.^a

Contributing to this stable rating are information control and the Kremlin’s framing of the Ukraine conflict. Even previous downward deviations usually fell within the standard of error (+/-3 percent).

- As has been noted, the Kremlin exerts strong control over information in Russia, particularly television, and laws punish criticism of the state. Criticism of Putin is equated with criticism of the Russian state. This extensive information control raises questions about the reliability of these consistently high support levels.
- **Outlook:** Putin is expected to maintain strong political control in the near to mid-term, relying on propaganda and domestic stability to reinforce his leadership.

Ukrainian trust in President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has been steadily increasing since March, reflecting his public defiance against suggested concessions. Trust in Zelenskyy jumped from 57 percent in February 2025 to 69 percent in March, likely because of public praise for demanding security guarantees during his March meeting


with U.S. President Donald Trump. By May, approval of Zelenskyy rose to 74 percent, as he continued to take an uncompromising stance toward reported Russian conditions for peace, which include significant political and territorial concessions. This positive domestic reaction was further bolstered by his public interaction with Trump.

- Zelenskyy bolsters his domestic support through near-daily addresses to the nation regarding the war and anti-corruption measures. Additionally, he has offered to step down as president if the Ukrainian people call for it. As of March 2025, most Ukrainians believe that holding elections or changing political leadership during wartime would be detrimental to Ukraine.²⁹
- **Outlook:** Zelenskyy will likely not voluntarily leave the presidency, and his approval ratings will grow as he maintains steadfast against significant territorial concessions and for guarantees to secure Ukraine’s sovereignty.

SUPPORT FOR UKRAINE & RUSSIA³⁰

Europeans overwhelmingly support Ukraine over Russia. Older Europeans are influenced by their memories of the Cold War, while younger generations are shaped by media themes, ideals of justice, and, for many Europeans, concerns about potential physical threats and impacts on their standards of living.


- Respondents from France, Germany, Great Britain, and Poland showed strong support for Ukraine with 65 percent in favor and only 5 percent supporting Russia. Twenty-nine percent of Europeans were neutral or did not support either side.³¹



^a In summer 2023 Putin faced the PMC Wagner revolt led by his erstwhile ally Yevgeny Prigozhin (see GCKN Running Estimate Update 12, “Putin’s Partners”: PMC Wagner, August 4, 2023) and in Fall of 2024 Ukraine launched its offensive into Russia’s Kursk region, seizing and holding Russian territory for the first time.


- Nearly 61 percent of Europeans from France, Germany, Great Britain, and Poland support continuing aid to Ukraine, reflecting a strong overall favorability rating. Only 22 percent of Europeans oppose continued aid.³³

EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES ON PROVIDING AID TO UKRAINE³⁴



■ Favor Continued Aid
 ■ Oppose Continued Aid
 ■ Other

RUSSIAN PERSPECTIVES ON THE UNITED STATES³⁶



■ Unfavorable ■ Favorable

those who get their news from the internet are more likely to have a positive view.³⁷

- While specific approval ratings of the United States among Ukrainians are not readily available, nearly 48 percent of Ukrainians consider the United States a strategic partner and a symbol of global democracy.³⁸ In contrast, 64 percent view Europe as an ally.³⁹ However, as previously reported, only 24 percent of Ukrainians believe that the United States seeks a just peace and 67 percent feel the United States is growing weary of supporting Ukraine and is encouraging concessions for Russia to end the war.⁴⁰ This sentiment contrasts with 64 percent of Ukrainians who believe that Europe is committed to achieving a just peace.⁴¹

PERSPECTIVES ON THE UNITED STATES

“The Ukrainian side officially hopes that the Americans will finally understand that the Russians always lie. I unofficially doubt it. The U.S. wants to be friends with Putin.”

- Andriy Klymenko, chief editor of the BlackSeaNews³⁵

Fifty-one percent of Russians hold an unfavorable view of the United States and only 30 percent view it favorably. This perception is influenced by age and the source of news consumed.

- Older Russians, particularly those consuming state-controlled television, tend to have a more negative outlook, whereas younger Russians and

RUSSIAN AND UKRAINIAN VIEWS ON PRESIDENT TRUMP'S APPROACH TO RESOLVING THE CONFLICT

Approval of President Trump Regarding the War⁴²



"I don't believe in the success of Trump's peace initiatives in general and I don't really believe even in those partial restrictions, but I welcome any restrictions on war, as long as they do not lead to the loss of our sovereignty and do not worsen our situation on the battlefield."

- Karl Volokh, Ukrainian blogger⁴³

"[Trump's] the American president. He was elected. He can't be stupid. Maybe this is just the way he operates, and we don't see the bigger picture."

- Ukrainian field commander⁴⁵

"At least half of the people around me, if not more...hoped for Trump and a quick peace. And almost all of them are now disappointed."

-employee of a Russian federal institution from a border region⁴⁴

"Nothing is lost yet. Trump is trying to achieve peace not for [Russian] or Ukrainian interests, but for his own and his country. Therefore, he will continue to work on the settlement. In our case, the conditions under which we can talk about it are simply slowly improving."

-Russian border region parliament deputy⁴⁶

"This is typical of the Russian people: there is no point in believing their own, but they are very inclined to believe what the most powerful person in the world, the head of the United States, says and promises...standard skepticism prevailed...but it was obvious that [faith in the possibility of a peace deal] began to manifest itself as a kind of material force: a sharp rise in indices, a sharp, completely incomprehensible strengthening of the ruble against the dollar. This could not be explained by anything else except the sudden assurances and feelings that the war was over, peace would come, and therefore the economic situation in Russia would improve, sanctions would be lifted, and Russia would rule the world together with America...It is unclear to what extent the blissful belief that Russia and America will rule the world together will spread among the Russian population and when it will fade away, but when it becomes clear that there is no reason for optimism, disappointment will come, and it will be quite serious. Then there will be a period of confusion. Because of this, some kind of collapse of opportunities [for the Russian authorities] may occur."

- Russian social psychologist Alexey Roshchin⁴⁷

RUSSIAN PERCEPTIONS

A growing number of Russians report feeling calm rather than anxious about U.S.-Russia relations and Trump's approach to end the conflict. In a March 2025 poll, 44 percent of Russians believed Trump was trying to end the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, while 28 percent believed Trump is trying to prolong the war, and 24 percent were unsure.⁴⁸ A state-controlled Russian poll indicated that Russians felt less anxious about U.S.-Russia relations as Trump assumed office. That feeling began to decline, however, after a proposed ceasefire failed to materialize.⁴⁹

- In December 2024, 46 percent of respondents felt calm about U.S.-Russia relations.
- In March 2025, around the time of the proposed ceasefire presented by the United States, 58 percent of Russians felt calm about U.S.-Russia relations, while 36 percent felt anxious.
- By April 2025, 54 percent of Russians felt calm about U.S.-Russia relations, and 39 percent felt anxious.

UKRAINIAN PERCEPTIONS

Conversely, Ukrainians' views of Trump's presidency have significantly deteriorated since the election. In November 2024, nearly half of Ukrainians expressed distrust of Trump.⁵⁰ However, in December 2024, 54 percent believed his presidency would be beneficial to Ukraine, while 21 percent believed it would be detrimental.⁵¹

- By March 2025, only 19 percent felt the Trump presidency was positive for Ukraine and 73 percent thought it was unfavorable.⁵²
- In a separate March poll, only 28 percent of Ukrainians believed in a Ukrainian victory while Trump was president.⁵³ By April, nearly 90 percent of Ukrainians said they do not trust Trump.⁵⁴

IMPLICATIONS

- A widespread perception that Trump favors Russia over Ukraine, coupled with clear popular Ukrainian distrust of Trump and Russia, could continue to hamper U.S. efforts to broker peace. However, there was no indication that either the Ukrainian government or its people distrust the American military.
- Despite anxiety in Ukraine regarding potential disruptions of U.S. aid, the Ukrainian military will almost certainly continue to welcome U.S. Army training and advising.
- Strong European support for Ukraine, coupled with increasingly negative views of Russia and Putin, and reciprocal Ukrainian trust in Europe, suggest continued—and potentially increased—European engagement on stabilizing the conflict.

RESEARCH TEAM

Robert W. Kurz
Director of GCKN, Editor

Benjamin A. Okonofua, Ph.D.
Research Analyst

Cindy A. Hurst
Editor

Andrew M. Johnson, LTC (Ret), USA
Lead Research Analyst

Nicole M. Laster-Loucks, Ph.D.
Editor

Susan L. Littleton
Creative Director

ENDNOTES

- 1 Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) poll on 12-25 March, <https://kiis.com.ua/?lang=eng&cat=reports&id=1509&page=1>; “Conflict with Ukraine in April 2025: Attention, Support, Attitude to Negotiations, Pros and Cons of the Special Operation, Attitude towards Participants in the SMO,” Levada Center, May 6, 2025, <https://www.levada.ru/2025/05/06/konflikt-s-ukrainoj-v-aprele-2025-goda-vnimanie-podderzhka-otnoshenie-k-peregovoram-i-predlozheniyu-30-dnevnogo-peremiriya-otnoshenie-k-uchastnikam-svo/>; “The Conflict with Ukraine: Attention, Support, Attitude to Negotiations and Possible Concessions, Opinion on the Various Terms of a Peace Agreement in February 2025,” Levada Center, March 10, 2025, <https://www.levada.ru/en/2025/03/10/the-conflict-with-ukraine-attention-support-attitude-to-negotiations-and-possible-concessions-opinion-on-the-various-terms-of-a-peace-agreement-in-february-2025/>
- 2 “We’ve got a former governor jailed here, what Trump?” How Russia reacted to the fact that the Easter truce did not happen,” Verstka, April 18, 2025, <https://verstka.media/u-nas-tut-byvshego-gubernatora-posadili-kakoj-tramp-kak-v-rossii-otreagirovali-na-to-chto-pashalnogo-peremiriya-ne-sluchilos>
- 3 Yuliia Taradiuk and Asami Terajima, “In Kyiv, skepticism about ceasefire reigns as Russia ramps up deadly attacks and US remains mute,” Kyiv Independent, April 8, 2025, <https://kyivindependent.com/ukrainians-skeptical-about-potential-ceasefire-as-russia-ramps-up-deadly-attacks-and-us-remains-mute/>
- 4 “EU officially endorses unconditional 30-day ceasefire between Ukraine and Russia,” Kyiv Independent, May 10, 2025, https://kyivindependent.com/eu-officially-endorses-unconditional-30-day-ceasefire-between-ukraine-and-russia/?mc_cid=96bf1cebe4&mc_eid=b1bfc9ed52
- 5 Kate Tsurkan, “Most Russians ‘don’t care about the war,’ says journalist Ekaterina Barabash after escaping Russia,” Kyiv Independent, May 10, 2025, <https://kyivindependent.com/almost-all-russians-poisoned-by-imperial-propaganda-says-journalist-ekaterina-barabash-after-escaping-russia/>
- 6 John O’Sullivan, Wil Walker, and Will Stewart, “Putin tells Trump he won’t consider peace deal because ‘Russia is on the verge of victory,’” Daily Express U.S., May 22, 2025, <https://www.the-express.com/news/world-news/172488/ukraine-drone-strikes-hit-moscow-putin-set-reject-peace-despite-trump-promise>
- 7 “The Conflict with Ukraine: Attention, Support, Attitude to Negotiations and Possible Concessions, Opinion on the Various Terms of a Peace Agreement in February 2025,” Levada Center, March 10, 2025, <https://www.levada.ru/en/2025/03/10/the-conflict-with-ukraine-attention-support-attitude-to-negotiations-and-possible-concessions-opinion-on-the-various-terms-of-a-peace-agreement-in-february-2025/>
- 8 Banco, E., Landay, J., & Martina, M. “Chinese Nationals Fighting for Russia in Ukraine are Mercenaries-US Officials,” *Reuters*, April 11, 2025, <https://www.reuters.com/world/chinese-nationals-fighting-russia-ukraine-are-mercenaries-us-officials-2025-04-11/>
- 9 https://t.me/russian_field_soc/2444
- 10 “Conflict with Ukraine in April 2025: Attention, Support, Attitude to Negotiations, Pros and Cons of the Special Operation, Attitude towards Participants in the SMO,” Levada Center, May 6, 2025, <https://www.levada.ru/2025/05/06/konflikt-s-ukrainoj-v-aprele-2025-goda-vnimanie-podderzhka-otnoshenie-k-peregovoram-i-predlozheniyu-30-dnevnogo-peremiriya-otnoshenie-k-uchastnikam-svo/>
- 11 “The Conflict with Ukraine: Attention, Support, Attitude to Negotiations and Possible Concessions, Opinion on the Various Terms of a Peace Agreement in February 2025,” Levada Center, March 10, 2025, <https://www.levada.ru/en/2025/03/10/the-conflict-with-ukraine-attention-support-attitude-to-negotiations-and-possible-concessions-opinion-on-the-various-terms-of-a-peace-agreement-in-february-2025/>
- 12 “Conflict with Ukraine in April 2025: Attention, Support, Attitude to Negotiations, Pros and Cons of the Special Operation, Attitude towards Participants in the SMO,” Levada Center, May 6, 2025, <https://www.levada.ru/2025/05/06/konflikt-s-ukrainoj-v-aprele-2025-goda-vnimanie-podderzhka-otnoshenie-k-peregovoram-i-predlozheniyu-30-dnevnogo-peremiriya-otnoshenie-k-uchastnikam-svo/>
- 13 Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) poll on 12-25 March, <https://kiis.com.ua/?lang=eng&cat=reports&id=1509&page=1>
- 14 Ibid.
- 15 Ibid.
- 16 Ibid.
- 17 Ibid.
- 18 “Almost 50% of Ukrainians consider the US a bastion of democracy despite Trump’s rhetoric, poll finds,” *Censor.net*, April 9, 2025, <https://censor.net/ua/news/3545853/mayije-polovyna-ukrayintsiv-vvajayut-ssha-strategichnym-partnerom-popry-rytoryku-trampa; “3% of Ukrainians believe in just peace in Ukraine under Trump’s presidency – poll,” Censor.net, April 1, 2025, https://censor.net/en/news/3544349/ukrainians-have-lost-hope-for-a-just-peace-under-trump>
- 19 “Ukraine: After the Fallout,” *More in Common*, March 2-5, 2025, <https://www.moreincommon.com/media/l2cb5qyc/more-in-common-ukraine-comparative-march-2025.pdf>
- 20 “Almost 50% of Ukrainians consider the US a bastion of

- democracy despite Trump's rhetoric, poll finds," Censor.net, April 9, 2025, <https://censor.net/ua/news/3545853/mayije-polovyna-ukrayintsiv-vvayayut-ssha-strategichnym-partnerom-popry-rytoryku-trampa>; 67% of citizens believe that US is tired of Ukraine - KIIS poll," Censor.net, April 1, 2025, <https://censor.net/en/news/3544351/the-us-is-tired-of-ukraine-kiis-poll-details>; Anton Hrushetskyi, "Perception of the policy of the West, Europe and the USA regarding Ukraine and the perception of the policy of D. Trump," Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, February 14-March 4, 2025 and March 12-22, 2025, <https://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=eng&cat=reports&id=1511&page=1&t=1>
- 21 Anton Hrushetskyi, "Perception of the policy of the West, Europe and the USA regarding Ukraine and the perception of the policy of D. Trump," Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, February 14-March 4, 2025 and March 12-22, 2025, <https://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=eng&cat=reports&id=1511&page=1&t=1>
- 22 "“Ghost town”, visitors from Dagestan and propaganda on TV. How people live in temporarily occupied Russian-occupied Berdyansk — The Telegraph," New Voice, March 31, 2025, <https://nv.ua/ukr/ukraine/events/berdyansk-u-the-telegraph-rozpovili-yak-zhivut-lyudi-v-timchasovo-okupovanomu-rf-misti-50502364.html>
- 23 Ibid.
- 24 "Mejlis of Crimean Tatar people rejects any proposals regarding Russian status of Crimea," Ukrinform, April 25, 2025, <https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-society/3985837-mejlis-of-crimean-tatar-people-rejects-any-proposals-regarding-russian-status-of-crimea.html>; "STATEMENT of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People on the inadmissibility of recognizing Crimea as Russian," The Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People, April 24, 2025, <https://qtm.org/zayava-medzhisu-krymskotatarskogo-narodu-shhodo-neprypustymosti-vyznannya-krymu-rosijskym/>
- 25 Anna Fratsyvir, "Majority of Ukrainians unwilling to trade territory or Western path for peace, poll shows," Kyiv Independent, May 8, 2025, <https://kyivindependent.com/majority-of-ukrainians-unwilling-to-trade-territory-or-western-path-for-peace-poll-shows/>; Razumkov Center-Kyiv Security Forum poll, April 24-May 4, 2025, <https://razumkov.org.ua/napriamky/sotsiologichni-doslidzhennia/chervoni-linii-ukrainy-gromadska-dumka-i-natsionalni-perekonannia-kviten-traven-2025r>
- 26 Asami Terajima, "“Like a game of tennis’ — Russia, Ukraine court Trump to avoid being blamed for peace talks failure," Kyiv Independent, May 12, 2025, <https://kyivindependent.com/like-a-game-of-tennis-russia-ukraine-court-trump-to-avoid-being-blamed-for-peace-talks-failure/>; Kateryna Shkarlat, "Zelenskyy and Trump failed. Putin wants to distance himself from collapse of talks – Russian media," RBC-Ukraine, April 18, 2025, <https://newsukraine.rbc.ua/news/zelenskyy-and-trump-failed-putin-wants-to-1744991938.html>; "“We’ve got a former governor jailed here, what Trump?” How Russia reacted to the fact that the Easter truce did not happen," Verstka, April 18, 2025, <https://verstka.media/u-nas-tut-byvshego-gubernatora-posadili-kakoj-tramp-kak-v-rossii-otreagirovali-na-to-cto-pashalnogo-peremiriya-ne-sluchilos>
- 27 "April 2025 Ratings: Sentiments, Assessments of the State of Affairs in the Country, Approval of the Authorities, Trust in Politicians, Presidential and Party Electoral Ratings," Levada Center, April 25, 2025, <https://www.levada.ru/2025/04/25/rejtingi-aprelya-2025-goda-nastroeniya-otsenki-polozheniya-del-v-strane-odobrenie-organov-vlasti-doverie-politikam-prezidentskie-i-partijnye-elektoralnye-rejtingi/>; Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, <https://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=eng&cat=reports&id=1529&page=1>
- 28 Ibid.
- 29 "KIIS: Level of trust in Zelenskyy amid aggravation of relations with the Trump administration increases to 68%," Interfax, March 7, 2025, <https://en.interfax.com.ua/news/general/1053954.html>; Anastasia Protz, "Ukrainians' trust in Zelenskyy rises to 74% in early May – survey," Ukrainian Pravda, May 14, 2025, <https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2025/05/14/7512196/>; Kyiv International Institute of Sociology survey, May 2-12, 2025, <https://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=eng&cat=reports&id=1529&page=1>; Oleksandr Shumilin, "Two thirds of Ukrainians oppose idea of elections during war," Ukrainska Pravda, March 25, 2025, <https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2025/03/25/7504451/>
- 30 Ibid.
- 31 "Ukraine: After the Fallout," More in Common, March 2-5, 2025, <https://www.moreincommon.com/media/l2cb5qyc/more-in-common-ukraine-comparative-march-2025.pdf>
- 32 "Ukraine: After the Fallout," More in Common, March 2-5, 2025, <https://www.moreincommon.com/media/l2cb5qyc/more-in-common-ukraine-comparative-march-2025.pdf>
- 33 "Ukraine: After the Fallout," More in Common, March 2-5, 2025, <https://www.moreincommon.com/media/l2cb5qyc/more-in-common-ukraine-comparative-march-2025.pdf>
- 34 "Ukraine: After the Fallout," More in Common, March 2-5, 2025, <https://www.moreincommon.com/media/l2cb5qyc/more-in-common-ukraine-comparative-march-2025.pdf>
- 35 Andrii Klymenko, Facebook, March 25, 2025, <https://tinyurl.com/zpaukc5a>
- 36 "Attitudes Towards Belarus, China, The USA, Germany, the European Union and Ukraine in February 2025, Levada Center, March 13, 2025, <https://tinyurl.com/48pbsmbx>
- 37 Ibid.
- 38 "Almost 50% of Ukrainians consider the US a bastion of democracy despite Trump's rhetoric, poll finds," Censor.net, April 9, 2025, <https://censor.net/ua/news/3545853/mayije-polovyna-ukrayintsiv-vvayayut-ssha-strategichnym-partnerom-popry-rytoryku-trampa>; 67% of citizens believe that US is tired of Ukraine - KIIS poll," Censor.net, April 1, 2025, <https://censor.net/en/news/3544351/the-us-is-tired-of-ukraine-kiis-poll-details>; Anton Hrushetskyi, "Perception of the policy of the West, Europe and the USA regarding Ukraine and the perception of the policy of D. Trump," Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, February 14-March 4, 2025 and March 12-22, 2025, <https://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=eng&cat=reports&id=1511&page=1&t=1>
- 39 Anton Hrushetskyi, "Perception of the policy of the West, Europe and the USA regarding Ukraine and the perception of the policy of D. Trump," Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, February 14-March 4, 2025 and March 12-22, 2025, <https://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=eng&cat=reports&id=1511&page=1&t=1>
- 40 "Almost 50% of Ukrainians consider the US a bastion of democracy despite Trump's rhetoric, poll finds," Censor.net, April 9, 2025, <https://censor.net/ua/news/3545853/mayije-polovyna-ukrayintsiv-vvayayut-ssha-strategichnym-partnerom-popry-rytoryku-trampa>; 67% of citizens believe that US is tired of Ukraine - KIIS poll," Censor.net, April 1, 2025, <https://censor.net/en/news/3544351/the-us-is-tired-of-ukraine-kiis-poll-details>; Anton Hrushetskyi, "Perception

of the policy of the West, Europe and the USA regarding Ukraine and the perception of the policy of D. Trump,” Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, February 14-March 4, 2025 and March 12-22, 2025, <https://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=eng&cat=reports&id=1511&page=1&t=1>

- 41 Anton Hrushetskyi, “Perception of the policy of the West, Europe and the USA regarding Ukraine and the perception of the policy of D. Trump,” Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, February 14-March 4, 2025 and March 12-22, 2025, <https://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=eng&cat=reports&id=1511&page=1&t=1>
- 42 “April 2025 Ratings: Sentiments, Assessments of the State of Affairs in the Country, Approval of the Authorities, Trust in Politicians, Presidential and Party Electoral Ratings,” Levada Center, April 25, 2025, <https://www.levada.ru/2025/04/25/rejtingi-aprelya-2025-goda-nastroeniya-otsenki-polozheniya-del-v-strane-odobrenie-organov-vlasti-doverie-politikam-prezidentskie-i-partijnye-elektoralnye-rejtingi/>; Ben Kamisar, “Poll: Most Americans are rooting for Ukraine. But nearly half think Trump prefers Russia, NBC News, March 17, 2025, <https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/trump-administration/poll-americans-are-rooting-ukraine-think-trump-prefers-russia-rcna196163>; <https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/25597409-nbc-march-2025-poll/>; https://t.me/russian_field_soc/2444
- 43 Karl Volokh, Facebook, March 25, 2025, <https://tinyurl.com/4pycu5sh>
- 44 ““We’ve got a former governor jailed here, what Trump?” How Russia reacted to the fact that the Easter truce did not happen,” Verstka, April 18, 2025, <https://verstka.media/u-nas-tut-byvshego-gubernatora-posadili-kakoj-tramp-kak-v-rossii-otreagirovali-na-to-chto-pashalnogo-peremiriya-ne-sluchilos>
- 45 James Longman, “On the Ukrainian front, soldiers react to Trump: Reporter’s notebook,” ABC News, March 15, 2025, <https://abcnews.go.com/International/ukrainian-front-soldiers-react-trump-reporters-notebook/story?id=119811366>
- 46 ““We’ve got a former governor jailed here, what Trump?” How Russia reacted to the fact that the Easter truce did not happen,” Verstka, April 18, 2025, <https://verstka.media/u-nas-tut-byvshego-gubernatora-posadili-kakoj-tramp-kak-v-rossii-otreagirovali-na-to-chto-pashalnogo-peremiriya-ne-sluchilos>
- 47 Ibid.
- 48 https://t.me/russian_field_soc/2444
- 49 ““We’ve got a former governor jailed here, what Trump?” How Russia reacted to the fact that the Easter truce did not happen,” Verstka, April 18, 2025, <https://verstka.media/u-nas-tut-byvshego-gubernatora-posadili-kakoj-tramp-kak-v-rossii-otreagirovali-na-to-chto-pashalnogo-peremiriya-ne-sluchilos>
- 50 Ulyana Krychkovska and Alona Mazurenko, “Almost 90% of Ukrainians don’t trust Trump, poll shows,” Ukrainian Pravda, April 29, 2025, <https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2025/04/29/7509726/>; New Europe Center poll, April 10-15, 2025, <https://neweurope.org.ua/en/analytics/100-dniv-trampa-i-90-ukrayintsiv/>
- 51 Anton Hrushetskyi, “Perception of the policy of the West, Europe and the USA regarding Ukraine and the perception of the policy of D. Trump,” Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, February 14-March 4, 2025 and March 12-22, 2025, <https://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=eng&cat=reports&id=1511&page=1&t=1>
- 52 Ibid.
- 53 “Almost 50% of Ukrainians consider the US a bastion of democracy despite Trump’s rhetoric, poll finds,” Censor.net, April 9, 2025, <https://censor.net/ua/news/3545853/mayije-polovyna-ukrayintsiv-vvajayut-ssha-strategichnym-partnerom-popry-rytoryku-trampa>
- 54 Ulyana Krychkovska and Alona Mazurenko, “Almost 90% of Ukrainians don’t trust Trump, poll shows,” Ukrainian Pravda, April 29, 2025, <https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2025/04/29/7509726/>; New Europe Center poll, April 10-15, 2025, <https://neweurope.org.ua/en/analytics/100-dniv-trampa-i-90-ukrayintsiv/>

